

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 ACDA-10 PM-03

SPC-01 L-02 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00

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P R 251245Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5610

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 7565

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AF

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS - NAIM'S VIEWS

REF: STATE 209022

SUMMARY: NAIM SYWED OVERRIDING WORRY ABOUT IMPACT OF ME CRISIS ON US-USSR DETENTE AND FEAR THAT ANOTHER CEASEFIRE, WITHOUT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF 242, WOULD SOON BREAK DOWN, WITH WIDER INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER POWERS ON "NEXT ROUND." URGED CLOSEST US/SOVIET COOLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE (IMPOSED) OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING FULL EVACUATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY.

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT DAOUD'S BROTHER, NAIM, AT FOREIGN MINISTRY OCTOBER 25 (HAVING EARLIER ASKED FOR APPOINTMENT FOR A TTUR D'HORIZON) PRIMARILY TO CLARIFY CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEPFONMIN WAHID ABDUTDAH'S FAILURE TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON IN WASHINGTON (SEPTEL). BEFORE WE GOT TO PURPOSE OF MY CALL, HOWEVER, NAIM LAUNCHED INTO IO2 R DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND AFGHANISTAN'S DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT COURSE OF EVENTS. READING
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BETWEEN LINES OF HIS REMARKS, I THINK IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO

RECONSTRUCT NATURE OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NIXON WHICH ABDULLAH WAS CARRYING FROM PRESIDENT DAOUD, EVEN THOUGH LETTER WAS APPARENTLY NOT DELIVERED.

2. GOA IS PREOCCUPIED WITH OVERRIDING FEAR THAT A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE WILL SOON LEAD ONLY TO RENEWED HOSTILITIES TO THE REGIONAL POWERS ON ANY NEXT ROUND. NAIM REFERRED TO "MENACING CONFRONTATION" BETWEEN US AND SOVIET FLEETS IN MEDITERRANEAN TO COMPETITIVE ARMS SUPPLY EFFORTS. HE OBVIOUSLY GIVES OVERRIDING PRIORITY TO IMPORTANCE TO PROTECTING US-USSR DETENTE, WHICH OF COURSE ACCORDS WITH AFGHAN INTERESTS IN SEEING US AND USSR CO-EXIST SATISFACTORILY WITH RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN ITSELF.

3. WEDDING FROM THIS PREMISE, NAIM PUT GREAT STRESS ON ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY OF US AND USSR TO ACHIEVE SOLUTION, THAT IS A SOLUTION

ALONG LINES OF SY RESOLUTION 242. THE AFGHAN POSITION, AS IT IS PROBABLY STATED IN THE DAOUD LETTER, PUTS GREAT STRESS ON ALLEGED ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ALL ASPECTS OF 242 AND ALLEGED ISRAELI

INTRANSIGENCE. THE MESSAGE VERY PROBABLY ASKED PRESIDENT NIXON TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE USSR IN ACHIEVING IMPLEMENTATION OF 242, IN RESTORING OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES TO EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND IN PROVIDING SOME SORT OF DIRECT GUARANTEES FOR A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT.

4. IN A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH NAIM OF THESE POINTS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, I FOLLOWED CAREFULLY GUIDANCE IN REFTEL. I SOUGHT TO REASSURE HIM ABOUT US DETERMINATION TO PROTECT THE OVERALL DETENTE, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT DETENTE IS A "TWO-WAY STRATEGY" AND THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THE SOVIETS ALSO SO REGARD IT. NAIM SAID THAT FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH BREZHNEV DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS, AND BREZHNEV IN PARTICULAR, PLACE A VERY HIGH VALUE INDEED ON THEIR DETENTE WITH THE US. HE BELIEVE THE ATMOSPHERE IS RIGHT FOR BOTH GREAT POWERS TO WORK TOGETHER TO LIMIT THE DANGER OF SPREAD OF WAR AND TO PRODUCE A LASTING
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SETTLEMENT ALONG LINES OF 242. IN THIS PART OF OUR DISCUSSION, I RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO POINT THAT ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE GREAT PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. WHILE THE GREAT POWERS WERE BEING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN A POSITION TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT, THEY COULD NOT IMPOSE IT ON THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED. ; -8. 53,\$3\$ TO DISMISS THIS ARGUMENT, AS OTHER AFGHANS GENERALLY DO PARTICULARLY IN ANY DISCUSSION OF ISRAEL.

5. NAIM PUT FORWARD TOWARD THE END OF OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT THE IDEA THAT ONCE ISRAELI TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN TO THEIR PRE-1967 FRONTIERS THOSE FRONTIERS COULD BE PERMANENTLY GURANTEED BY THE US AND THE USSR. HE ADMITTED THAT FOR GURANTEES OF THIS TYPE TO BE PERSUASIVE ONE WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO BACK THEM UP WITH FORCEI AND THAT A COLLECTIVE GURANTEE INVOLVING EITHER A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE OR SEVERAL OF THE MAJOR POWERS MIGHT BE POLITICALLY LESS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. BUT HE INSISTED THAT NOTMKNG COULD REPLACE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE US AND THE USSR IN ANY GUARANTEED FORMULA.

6. IT WAS APPARENT FROM THE FERVOR WITH WHICH NAIM DISCPKWYD THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS THAT HE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING IT CLOSELY AND IS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN

THEREFORE ASSUME
THAT PRESIDENT DAOUD'S INITIATIVE IN SENDING A MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT NIXON ON THIS SUBJECT CAME FROM NAIM.
LEWIS

NOTE BY OCT: ### OMISSION;
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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NNN

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